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Outlook 
AND 
Appraisal 
The decision of the Scottish people on 
11 September to support the creation 
of a Scottish legislative Parliament 
with tax-varying powers is of historic 
significance. This expression of the 
people's will has ensured the eventual 
removal of the two-hundred year 
anomaly where Scotland is the only 
democratic country with its own legal 
system but no legislature of its own. 
Scotland will remain part of the United 
Kingdom with Westminster retaining 
responsibility for foreign affairs, 
defence and macro-economic stability, 
but the Scottish Parliament will be 
responsible for almost all other aspects 
of the business of government. The 
activities of the Scottish Parliament 
will therefore reach into almost every 
corner of Scottish life, not the least of 
which will be the economy. 
In his Foreword to the White Paper the 
Secretary of State for Scotland, Donald 
Dewar, argued that "(w)ith its new 
responsibilities, the Scottish Parliament will 
be in a position to encourage vigorous 
sustainable growth in the Scottish economy." 
Indeed it has been suggested that a sense of 
frustration with the continuing lagging 
performance of the Scottish economy was the 
driving force which united the various groups 
that set up the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention (SCC) (Laramie and Mair, 1997). 
The SCC's proposals for a Scottish Parliament 
were largely followed by the new Labour 
Government in their White Paper to which the 
referendum was addressed. Yet, in the debate 
preceding the referendum, the economic 
issues that dominated were those relating to 
the financing of the Parliament and the impact 
of the tax varying powers. This was 
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unfortunate because as Newlands points out 
"the economic possibilities of a Scottish 
Parliament are not to be located with 
regard to the financing of Scottish public 
expenditure but with regard to its impact 
on the rate of economic growth and 
development in Scotland" (Newlands, 1997, 
p. 109). We believe that it is essential that a 
debate begins as soon as possible on the 
possibilities for a Scottish Parliament to 
improve the long-run economic performance 
of the Scottish economy. The debate is 
essential if the Executive and Members of the 
first Parliament are to move quickly and 
effectively to address Scotland's historic 
economic problems, particularly the poor 
performance of Scottish owned industrial 
activities, including low innovation and firm 
formation rates, leading to weak employment 
growth, high unemployment, and significant 
net outmigration of population. 
We seek to make a contribution to this debate 
by highlighting where some of the economic 
possibilities for a Scottish Parliament might 
lie and by drawing attention to some key 
issues along the way. 
A New Partnership 
Scotland currently enjoys a significant 
decentralisation of administration, with the 
Scottish Office responsible for a large Budget 
of about £14.5bn and considerable autonomy 
to develop economic policy for delivery 
through Scottish Enterprise (SE), Highland 
and Islands Enterprise (HIE), Locate in 
Scotland, Scottish Trade International and 
many other agencies. The creation of a 
Scottish Parliament will add decentralisation 
of choice to the current devolved 
administration with the directly elected body 
responsible for all the present functions of the 
Scottish Office. It is reasonable to question 
whether this addition of democratic 
accountability to an already extensive range 
of devolved functions can make much 
difference to the impact of policy on the 
Scottish economy. Indeed, it was implicit in 
the "No-No" campaign that the Parliament 
was a flawed institution and so would be 
likely to damage economic performance. It is 
of course correct to point out that the quality 
of actors - the MSPs -, the nature of the 
powers conferred, and the Financing 
arrangements, are all likely to affect the 
performance of the Parliament in relation to 
the economy. But there is no a priori basis for 
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suggesting that devolution per se, tax varying 
powers apart1, will be damaging to the 
economy. Indeed, the implication of the 
relevant theoretical economics literature 
(fiscal federalism) is that decentralisation of 
choice, with a parliament focusing on 
allocation and growth (see below), should 
raise regional welfare. The Scottish 
Parliament should be more able, and should 
perhaps be more willing, than central 
government to match its tax and spend 
decisions to the preferences of Scottish 
residents. The Parliament will be better 
informed about, and better able to reflect, 
individuals' preferences (Newlands, 1997). It 
will therefore have the potential to make 
better choices, from the point of view of the 
Scottish people, and institute an earlier 
rectification of poor choices, although the 
nature of the parliamentary process could 
mean that decisions are taken more slowly 
(Bryan and Hill, 1997). 
The Parliament offers the opportunity to 
create a new partnership between government 
and the Scottish people for the benefit of the 
Scottish economy by strengthening networks 
of co-operation and by changing the rules and 
norms of behaviour (Newlands, 1997). The 
evidence from regions with successful 
economies and decentralised choice, such as 
the Third Italy, Baden-Wurtemberg in 
Germany, Rhone-Alpes in France and 
Catalonia in Spain, is that the performance of 
decentralised institutions linked to the 
institutionalisation of network structures 
favourable to innovation and collective 
learning, have been significant non-economic 
factors in the economic success of these 
regions. In addition, it is argued that the most 
successful areas place a high premium on 
trust, co-operation and social inclusion 
(Dunford and Hudson, 1996). It is not just 
growth that is the objective but "growth with 
development", where the benefits of growth 
are clearly seen to be shared widely 
throughout society. As a result, devolution of 
choice can, through partnership, lead to a 
more effective mobilisation of resources. 
Old and New Policies 
Newlands (1997) identifies four roles of 
government with respect to the economy: 
stabilisation of the macro-economy; 
distribution of income; allocation of resources 
to more efficient uses and the promotion of 
growth. There is a consensus amongst 
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economists th3l the proper economic role for 
a decentralised government is to focus on 
allocation and growth, leaving the pursuit of 
the stabilisation and distribution objectives to 
central government. It is well known that 
markets fail to secure an optimal allocation of 
resources. This is principally because of the 
presence of externalities, or spillovers, which 
are not mediated through the market, resulting 
in too little private provision of those goods 
with positive spillovers and too much market 
provision where the externalities are negative. 
Moreover, the market may fail to deliver the 
socially optimal rate of growth because of 
information failures and/or because the 
present generation places a too high value on 
present consumption, thereby saving and 
investing too little at the expense of the 
consumption of future generations. 
In providing services, the government seeks to 
correct the allocation of resources that would 
otherwise result from the operation of 
unfettered market forces. In Scotland today 
the provision of services is devolved to the 
Scottish Office and there are an array of 
policies to promote growth and development, 
principally through the activities of Scottish 
Enterprise and its associate agencies. Again it 
may be wondered whether the Scottish 
Parliament can improve on the achievements 
of the already devolved administrative 
structure. We have already noted that the 
Scottish Parliament is likely to be better 
informed, and more willing to satisfy the 
individual preferences of Scottish residents 
than the present decentralised administration 
of largely central government policies. But 
there is also good reason to believe that the 
Parliament will ensure the more efficient 
delivery of existing policies than the current 
governance arrangements. 
One argument that was traditionally used 
against the decentralisation of choice is that 
there are economies of scale in the production 
of goods and services which justifies a central 
concentration of the production and delivery 
functions. However, Smith, S. (1996) points 
out that government today is much less 
involved with the production of public 
services, functioning instead more as a 
purchaser and regulator than as direct 
producer. The attainment of economies of 
scale are therefore less important to the 
decision on the appropriate spatial level of 
government. Moreover, given that modem 
government is more concerned with 
ii 
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information processing activities than 
previously and given the evidence that such 
activities are subject to diseconomies of scale, 
with costs tending to rise more than 
proportionately with the size of government 
unit, the economic case for decentralisation 
has increased. Indeed, Smith argues that the 
costs of information processing are likely to 
be higher even when there is decentralisation 
of administration because of the need for at 
least some information transmission to 
London (Smith, S. 1996, p. 97). Further, a 
directly elected Parliament with legislative 
powers offers the prospect of a more effective 
control mechanism to: co-ordinate economic 
activity (Armstrong, 1997); ensure greater 
integration of the activities of the agencies 
responsible for economic development (Bryan 
and Hill, 1997); and constrain bureaucratic 
under performance (Smith, S. 1996). Hence, a 
Scottish Parliament should improve the 
delivery of existing policies and the efficiency 
of resource allocation within Scotland. 
The advent of a Scottish Parliament also 
brings the prospect of new policies to address 
Scotland's economic problems. During the 
last twenty years there has been a recognition 
that policies which affect the supply capacity 
of the economy are necessary to enhance 
economic growth. Moreover, it is generally 
believed that many of these policies are better 
formulated and implemented in the regions 
and areas where the problems are located. In 
other words, there has been a movement in 
favour of supply-side policies which are 
"bottom-up" rather than handed "top-down" 
from central government. The development of 
Scottish Enterprise, the network of Local 
Enterprise Companies, Technology Transfer 
and Innovation Centres, Enterprise 
Development Centres, intermediate labour 
markets such as those typified by the 
activities of the Wise Group, and skill centres, 
are all examples of this trend. Yet the 
parameters governing the formulation of 
economic development policy and the 
activities of institutions charged with 
development are still set by central 
government. It is argued, for example, that 
despite much decentralisation, the strategy 
towards training in Scotland is largely 
determined by the priorities of the UK 
Government in London (Newlands, 1997). 
Under a Scottish Parliament this will surely 
change. Policies will be formulated which 
more directly reflect Scotland's problems. 
Labour market policy will be able to reflect 
the greater incidence of long-term 
unemployment, lower participation rates and 
particular skill deficiencies in Scotland. 
Education policy will perhaps be more able to 
take account of the lower proficiency of 
Scottish school students in mathematics 
(Prais, 1997). Technology policy will be more 
able to remedy the low product innovation 
rate found in indigenous Scottish 
manufacturing firms (Roper et al, 1996). And 
there will be more scope for industrial policy 
to seek to address the implications of the ever 
increasing external control of Scottish 
economic activity, whether it be through 
takeover or inward 'greenfield' investments 
(Ashcroft and Love, 1993). Here the Scottish 
Parliament will want to build on the strengths 
of external ownership by encouraging higher 
local value added, increased local purchasing 
links, technology transfer, spin-outs, and 
networks, while at the same time minimising 
the threats, such as the loss or absence of key 
headquarters' functions: R&D, marketing and 
other key decision units. 
The Scottish Parliament will also wish to 
formulate economic policies which capitalise 
on Scotland's existing economic strengths. 
Several scholars who have undertaken 
research in this area recognise that 
decentralisation of choice, while it may or 
may not be a necessary condition for 
improved economic performance, is not 
sufficient to promote a faster rate of economic 
development. A region's, or nation's, resource 
endowments, which embrace all of its general 
and specific assets and resources including its 
economic structure, are considered by some to 
be of crucial significance (Dunford and 
Hudson, 1996). While for others it is the 
processes that are driving economic change in 
the region that are critical (Haynes et al, 
1997). This constitutes something of a truism 
but it highlights the need for the Parliament to 
be able to identify the key resources available 
to it, and to be aware of the processes that are 
driving economic change. 
The Scottish economy has many strengths. 
The work of Scottish Enterprise to identify 
potential 'clusters' of sectoral and industrial 
development in Scotland is surely something 
the Parliament will want to encourage and 
develop. The latent potential in tourism, 
engineering, chemicals, higher education, 
film, publishing and the electronic media in 
Scotland, offer opportunities for creative 
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policy intervention by the Parliament. And the 
strength and distinctiveness of the Scottish 
financial sector, particularly the banking 
sector, offers a range of policy opportunities 
which could be to the mutual benefit of both 
the sector and the wider Scottish economy 
(Dow, 1997). 
But to capitalise on the strengths of the 
Scottish economy and deal with its 
weaknesses, the Parliament needs to be fully 
informed. There needs to be an improvement 
in the economic statistics and advice available 
to the Parliament. Despite the excellent work 
of Scottish Office statisticians and 
economists, the data currently available on the 
Scottish economy is inadequate for informed 
policy making. Key data are either absent, or 
imperfect while existing data sets are 
incompletely analysed. For example, we 
require more accurate, timely and frequent 
data on Scottish GDP and its principal 
expenditure components. Data on the labour 
market require extension and improvement, 
e.g. in the area of skills and other labour 
supply characteristics. There is an absence of 
adequate data on the service sector, 
particularly the financial sector. Little is 
really known about the structure, conduct and 
performance of industry in Scotland, 
including cost structures, profitability, R&D, 
innovation behaviour, start-up rates and 
ownership and control. More resources must 
be devoted to this area if we are to take full 
advantage of the economic policy making 
autonomy of the Scottish Parliament. 
Furthermore, the Scottish Parliament will 
require a more developed source of 
independent economic advice than currently 
exists. Within the public domain the Secretary 
of State for Scotland receives economic 
advice from Scottish Office economists, and 
formally draws advice from outside 
government through the Scottish Economic 
Council and the Panel of Economic 
Consultants. The latter two advisory bodies 
meet infrequently and are inadequately 
resourced particularly to undertake research. 
We recommend that these two advisory 
bodies be replaced by a Scottish Economic 
Advisory Council (SEAC). SEAC should be 
modelled along the lines of the Northern 
Ireland Economic Council (NTEC)2 but 
structured and resourced to reflect the 
particular nature of the Scottish economy. 
SEAC would contain 15 to 20 members, with 
at least 5 to 7 members who are independent 
economists with specialist knowledge relevant 
to the Scottish economy. The remaining 
members would be nominated from the 
community to reflect the interests of the social 
partners including business, the unions and 
the voluntary sector. SEAC would also be 
appropriately staffed with an independent 
chairman of considerable experience and 
stature, a professional economist as director 
and three or four other professional 
economists and appropriate support staff, 
including a secretary. The Council would 
meet monthly and would advise the Scottish 
Parliament on the development of economic 
policy. SEAC would discharge the advice 
function through: the publication of reports on 
aspects of the Scottish economy and related 
matters drawing on the expertise of Council 
members, SEAC staff research and pieces of 
commissioned research which would largely 
be of a synthetic or synoptic nature revealing 
relevant research findings and best practice 
from throughout the world; holding seminars 
designed to promote debate; and by the 
provision of comment and advice, through 
responses to invitations from the Parliament 
and outer public bodies. The activities and 
proceedings of the Council would be open to 
public scrutiny to guarantee its independence, 
through its publications, its Annual Report 
and the public availability of its submissions. 
A New Voice for Scotland 
The creation of a Scottish Parliament offers 
the prospect of a new voice for Scotland in 
economic, and other, affairs. The legitimacy 
conferred by direct elections will allow the 
Parliament and its Executive to speak with 
authority on matters of significance to the 
Scottish economy. The Parliament will wish 
to influence the Scottish dimension of policies 
made in London and Brussels, through 
debates, committee investigations and active 
lobbying. In the EU, membership of the 
Committee of the Regions and the Economic 
and Social Committee should result in the 
Scottish viewpoint being listened to with 
greater interest and effect than with the 
present governance arrangements (Smith, N. 
1996). The new voice of Scotland will also be 
heard to greater effect within Britain by non-
departmental public bodies such as the Bank 
of England, the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission, the Office of Fair Trading, the 
various regulators, and the BBC. The 
legitimacy conferred on the Scottish 
Parliament will ensure that there is a powerful 
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voice to protest against any perceived harmful 
effects of EU and UK national policies. And it 
is a voice that will be seen and heard. 
One corollary of the creation of a new centre 
of political decision making in Scotland with 
a powerful voice, is that there are likely to be 
some beneficial effects on the location of 
economic activity. Many private sector 
organisations will wish to be physically close 
to the Parliament to take advantage of 
economies of localisation. Some private 
sector headquarters functions previously lost 
to Scotland may return. Others may be 
attracted. Thus the existence of the Parliament 
in Scotland may serve to diminish, if not 
reverse, the trend to increasing external 
control. It will therefore provide a boost to 
specific policies that the Parliament might 
develop to attract new headquarters functions 
to Scotland. 
A Qualified Freedom 
We believe that the creation of a Scottish 
Parliament offers considerable opportunities 
for the Scottish economy. However, it would 
be a mistake to believe that the Parliament is 
a panacea for Scotland's economic problems. 
Much that happens within the Scottish 
economy is driven by forces outside the 
borders of Scotland. The macroeconomy will 
continue to be principally affected by the 
world financial and commodity markets, as 
well as the decisions of the UK Treasury, the 
Bank of England and, if Britain joins the 
European single currency, the European 
Central Bank. The Budget of the Scottish 
Parliament will reflect the UK economic 
situation and political considerations as well 
as Scottish conditions. Decisions affecting 
corporate activity in Scotland will still be 
taken in London, Frankfurt, Seoul, Tokyo, 
Paris and New York. Employment legislation, 
social security policy and administration, the 
regulation of the professions, many other 
regulatory functions, and transport safety, will 
still be determined by the UK Government in 
London. Trading and product standards, 
subsidisation limits, and competition law will 
still be set in Brussels. 
Furthermore, the success of the Parliament 
will depend crucially on whether it can build 
support from, and harness the skills of, the 
Scottish people. In the words of Sir George 
Quigley, Chairman of the Northern Ireland 
Economic Council, at a recent seminar on 
decentralised government held at the 
University of Ulster, " the purpose of 
government is to provide strategic and 
hopefully charismatic leadership and thereby 
to enable the society to achieve its full 
potential, with all its members making their 
full contribution to, and sharing in the fruits 
of, economic performance The issue for 
every government is how to carry out that 
enabling function without locking the society 
into a state of dependency which enfeebles 
initiative and weakens the innovative, creative 
and problem solving capacities of the society. 
Institutions which are inappropriate or prone 
to malfunction can constrain economic 
performance." (NIEC, 1996, p. 210). The 
future members of the Scottish Parliament and 
its Executive would do well to heed his 
words. 
Notes 
1
 The assumption by many that the tax 
varying, and particularly tax raising, power 
will be damaging to the Scottish economy is 
seriously flawed. Simulations with the 
Institute's AMOS model suggest that if the 
Scottish workforce follow national bargaining 
outcomes i.e. don't push for higher pay in the 
face of the tax, rather than following local 
bargaining, then the impact of a 3p tax rise 
would raise output and employment as the 
extra government expenditures expand the 
economy by more than the effect of the 
reduction in worker expenditures due to the 
tax rise. (McGregor et al 1997) 
2
 The Director of the Fraser of Allander 
Institute, Brian Ashcroft, is a member of both 
the Secretary of State for Scotland's Panel of 
Economic Consultants and the Northern 
Ireland Economic Council. 
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